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Abstract 
Uganda and in particular the Ugandan police are perceived as highly corrupt. To address the integrity of 
police officers, an intervention called the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was 
implemented in selected police districts between 2010 and early 2013. This paper studies the impact of 
PARP for a sample of 600 police officers that were interviewed about police integrity by means of twelve 
hypothetical vignette cases depicting context-specific, undesirable behaviour of varying degrees of 
severity. The assessments of the cases by the police officers are analysed using propensity score 
matching, inverse probability weighting and seemingly unrelated regression techniques. We show that 
self-selection of police officers into the program is unlikely to drive the results. The results suggest that 
officers participating in PARP activities (i) judge the presented cases of misconduct more severely, (ii) 
are more inclined to report misconduct and (iii) also expect their colleagues to judge misbehaviour at 
the level of the police more critically although the latter two coefficient estimates are smaller in size. 
This suggests that PARP activities have affected the perception of police officers but only encouraged 
them moderately to actually take action against bad practices.  
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1. Introduction 
Integrity and accountability of public servants are key to discussions on ‘good governance’ or 
‘good government’ (Holmberg and Rothstein, 2012). Integrity is normally understood as ‘the 
quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules’ and can be a 
quality of individuals and organisations (Lasthuizen et al., 2011: 387). Corruption, generically 
defined as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Transparency International, 2016a), 
is a prominent aspect of public integrity, because there is almost universal agreement that this 
signals a serious governance quality deficit. The fight against corruption is not only seen as 
important for public sector performance, but also for development more generally and is 
therefore included among the Sustainable Development Goals (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 
2016: 5).  
 Traditionally, the police has received much attention in discussions about integrity 
because of its central role among the instruments of the state, in particular its ‘strong arm’. The 
functioning of the police, and more specifically the curbing of malpractice of its officers, is a 
measure of governance quality because of the centrality of the rule of law and law enforcement 
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 81-82).  
Previous research on police integrity has focused on (un)acceptable behaviour (Klockars 
et al., 2000, 2006; Kutnjak Ivković, 2005a, 2005b), as well as on the impact of organisational 
characteristics and the external environment on police officers’ attitudes (Chappell and Piquero, 
2004; Kutnjak Ivković and O’Connor Shelley, 2010; Kutnjak Ivković and Sauerman, 2013; 
Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015). Recent literature on the topic has also zoomed in on the 
extent to which policing reforms may reduce police misconduct (Collins et al., 2016) next to 
focusing on how corrupt officials respond to accountability mechanisms that increase the moral 
costs of misconduct (Olken and Pande, 2012).  
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The current paper contributes to the literature on public integrity and policing by 
analysing a specific intervention, the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP), 
implemented in Uganda between 2010 and 2013. PARP provided training to police officers and 
expanded contact with social stakeholders, thus aiming to influence the attitudes of Ugandan 
police officers on corruption and associated integrity violations. 
A main challenge of the crime and justice literature is to identify how integrity-
enhancing measures impact on the behaviour of public servants. Our attempt to identify causal 
effects rests on a quasi-experimental design. In line with earlier research on police integrity, 
and building on the approach introduced by Klockars et al. (2000), we do not ask police officers 
about their own policing practices and those of others but present them with hypothetical cases 
that they are asked to assess. Propensity score matching is applied to assess the impact of PARP. 
We find systematic observable differences in police integrity between PARP participants and 
non-participants, which suggest that participants (i) judge the presented cases of misconduct 
more severely, (ii) are more inclined to report misconduct and (iii) expect their colleagues to 
judge misbehaviour at the level of the police more critically. The results are most pronounced 
for normative judgements of case severity; they are reduced when it comes to actual reporting 
of misconduct. Thus, PARP was successful in diffusing knowledge about proper policing and 
human rights, which is demonstrated by the finding that more severe cases of integrity 
violations are judged more rigorously. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we situate our study 
in the literature on police integrity. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the Ugandan national 
police, while PARP is introduced in section 4. Sampling and survey are described in section 5 
and descriptive statistics presented in section 6. The empirical model is outlined in section 7. 
The results are discussed in section 8. Section 9 concludes. 
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2. Situating the study 
Research on the quality of policing has focused on (degrees of) integrity to get around the 
problem of studying actual acts of corruption and breaches of integrity. Building on the work 
of scholars such as Klockars et al. (2000; 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a), our study includes 
forms of corruption such as bribery but further extends to other integrity issues such as the 
maltreatment of suspects. We use Kutnjak Ivković’s (2005a: 16) definition of police corruption 
as ‘an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempted action or omission, 
committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer’s 
misuse of the official position, motivated in significant part by the achievement of personal 
gain’. Police integrity is understood as ‘the normative inclination among police to resist 
temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’ (Klockars et al., 2006: 1).  
Klockars et al. (2000; 2006) have argued that research should focus on police integrity 
rather than corruption, because the so-called ‘administrative/individual approach’, which aims 
at measuring the level of corrupt behaviour, encounters ‘enormous…obstacles’ (Klockars et al., 
2000: 3). The problems are illustrated in research that has tried to measure corruption by 
recording experiences in a survey (Tankebe, 2010), assessing activities through analysing 
written records (McMillan and Zoido, 2004) or accompanying corrupt individuals and 
observing the payment of bribes (Olken and Barron, 2009). An ‘organizational/occupational 
approach’ lends itself to asking ‘questions of fact and opinion that can be explored directly, 
without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behaviour are likely to 
provoke’ (Klockars et al., 2000: 3).  
While most earlier studies have mainly described the level of police integrity and 
misconduct, contemporary studies seek explanations of differences among groups of officers at 
the meso- and macro-level related to characteristics of police precincts, gender and race 
differences, and attitudes (Gottschalk, 2010; Hickman et al., 2016a; 2016b). Studies on non-
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Western countries have mainly focused on measuring police integrity within specific types of 
countries or regions, specific regimes and institutional cultures (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 21-27). 
These studies aimed at establishing a relationship of a variety of factors with police integrity. 
Such factors include differences between supervisors and line officers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and South Africa (Kutnjak 
Ivković and Sauerman, 2013), individual characteristics of officers in South Korea and Turkey 
(Cetinkaya 2010), gender differences in Romania (Andreescu et al., 2012), characteristics of 
organisational culture of police agencies in Turkey (Kucukuysal, 2008) and differences between 
urban and rural areas in Armenia (Kutnjak Ivković and Khechumyan, 2014). 
Kutnjak Ivković (2015: 18-27) has presented a comprehensive overview of the variety 
of research designs applied in the studies on police integrity in the tradition of Klockars et al. 
(2000; 2006); her overview has not, however, identified a single study that assesses the impact 
of an intervention that aims at enhancing police integrity. Our study focuses on a police reform 
project in Uganda. Contrary to earlier studies we compare participants benefitting from the 
intervention with non-participants, making use of information about individual police officers, 
their police station and district characteristics to control for confounding factors stemming from 
these levels. 
We build on the method that was pioneered by Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and Kutnjak 
Ivković (2005a; 2005b). The approach is based on presenting a series of ‘vignette cases’ – short 
hypothetical descriptions of forms of police misconduct – to police officers and registering their 
responses on the seriousness of the behaviour that is described and their willingness to report 
police officers who are responsible for the misconduct. The cases range from small-scale 
bribery to traffic offences, and from robbery to murder. Our survey questions ask for an 
assessment of the cases based on officers’ judgments about good policing and perceived best 
practices. Thus, instead of framing the survey as an assessment of police corruption it was 
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presented as a review of the challenges that police officers face. The advantage of the approach 
is the uniformity and resulting comparability of case assessments across individual officers. 
Since all officers assess identical scenarios, we can directly compare their judgments within 
each of the twelve cases.   
By focusing on Uganda, this study aims to enhance our knowledge about police integrity 
in the non-Western world. In recent years, the attention for policing in developing countries has 
increased (Tankebe, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2012, 2014; Kutnjak Ivković and Haberfeld, 2015; 
Collins et al., 2016) but there has been limited research on Africa or lower-income countries. 
Kutnjak Ivković’s (2015: 18-27) overview indicates that the vignette-based analysis has been 
used in 23 countries, including the US where the approach was developed and most studies 
were conducted. Of the 23 countries, only eight are outside Europe and North America, and 
only two are from Sub-Saharan Africa.† Studies on Eritrea and Pakistan have concentrated on 
measuring police integrity (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 22-23). South Africa has received more 
attention from researchers resulting in studies about police integrity in the Johannesburg area 
and at the national level; there is also a study about the code of silence in the South African 
police force (Kutnjak Ivković, 2015: 23-24).‡ Given the dearth of research done in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it seems relevant to obtain further evidence from countries on the continent. As Kutnjak 
Ivković and Haberfeld (2015: 365) have observed, ‘the contours of police integrity vary across 
the world. What is acceptable and tolerated in one country or one police agency may not be 
acceptable at all in another, and may be disciplined severely.’ 
 
 
                                                 
† The non-Western countries include two low- and lower-middle-income countries (Eritrea and Pakistan), five 
upper-middle-income countries (Armenia, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey and Thailand) and one high-income 
country (South Korea). 
‡ For a more detailed discussion, the overview by Kutnjak Ivković (2015) can be consulted.  
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3. Background: The Uganda National Police  
The 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector 
corruption worldwide, included Uganda in the top quintile of most corrupt countries 
(Transparency International, 2016b). The Ugandan police is regarded as particularly corrupt 
(Wambua, 2015; Basheka, 2013; Transparency International-Kenya, 2013). Surveys of the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006a) demonstrated that a majority of Ugandan 
citizens perceive the police as the most corrupt institution in the country. 
The Ugandan police force, which was institutionalized in 1906 (Uganda Police Force, 
2007), is divided functionally into 20 directorates based on tasks and geographically into 
regional and district units (Uganda Police, 2015). In the early 2000s, Uganda had fewer than 
15,000 police officers (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006b). At the end of 2014, 
the Inspector General announced the expansion of the police to 65,000 officers (Kakamwa, 
2014).  
In 2013, the crime rate was 273 per 100,000 Ugandans with public sector crime 
investigations being on the rise. The Ugandan police reported 413 investigations in 2013, 
compared to 214 in 2012. The Ugandan Police (2013) mentioned 19 cases in which police 
officers were under investigation of suspected crimes.   
 
4. The intervention: The Police Accountability and Reform Project 
Between 2007 and early 2013, the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was 
implemented by the civil society organization Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U), 
with financial support from the Dutch Embassy in Uganda.§ The project was realized against 
the background that the police force in Uganda is widely perceived as a partisan force. The 
main concerns were brutality, lack of respect for human rights, abuse of power and corruption.  
                                                 
§ The Embassy supported the project with €230,000 during the first phase (2007-2010) and €260,000 during the 
second phase (2010-2013). This article focuses on the activities implemented between 2010 and 2013. 
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The project objectives revolved around improving accountability and democratic 
governance within the police, in close cooperation with civil society organizations (CSOs). The 
assumption was that police integrity would be enhanced when external accountability 
mechanisms get established, as they strengthen local democratic control, citizen and media 
involvement (Newburn, 2015). The project brought together the police and civil society to 
foster exchange and implement external control. PARP objectives were to: (i) create stronger 
civilian oversight of the police, (ii) establish public safety and security networks based on the 
premise of a shared responsibility between the police and the public, (iii) enhance civil society’s 
contribution to the police review process, and (iv) contribute to a public order management 
system that protects the rights and freedoms of Ugandans to assembly (HURINET-U, 2013).  
The Dutch Embassy funded PARP because of HURINET-U’s longstanding relationship 
with the Ugandan police force. PARP was delivered by HURINET-U in collaboration with 
seven other civil society organizations in the form of advocacy work, workshops involving civil 
society representatives, the media and the police, field visits, information campaigns and radio 
broadcasts (HURINET-U, 2013). Next to disseminating the findings of the government’s police 
review process and publishing an analysis of the Public Management Order Bill 2010, 
HURINET-U organized various targeted activities during the second phase of the PARP project. 
Activities included five one-day CSO-police, three media-police and two student-police 
dialogues, around 40 work sessions involving the police and the project team, and field missions 
to document the role of the army and police during elections, in particular the heavily contested 
general elections of 2011 (Perrot, 2014). The aim of the dialogues was to discuss the abuse of 
power and brutality by the police and find ways to overcome misbehaviour by giving the public 
a role in general oversight. Further, HURINET-U distributed 700 copies of the police 
accountability newsletter ‘Police Watch’, organized visits of more than 850 citizens to police 
stations in four districts under the motto ‘Taking the police to the people: Enhancing 
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accountability’ and arranged for 15 radio talk shows in selected districts, usually in the local 
language and limited in ambit. The police accountability newsletter and the station visits aimed 
to increase transparency and reduce the potential for corruption. HURINET-U placed particular 
emphasis on human rights: after several meetings with representatives of the Ugandan police 
in early August 2012, the NGO distributed 10,000 copies of a newly introduced complaint form 
and 5,500 copies of a complaints handling manual. The form allows the filing of complaints 
against police officers who violate human rights and act unprofessionally. In particular, the 
latter activities aimed at putting human rights at the centre of the police-general public 
interactions.**  
The overview illustrates that PARP activities were heterogeneous and that each activity 
was limited in scope. The good and sustained relationship between HURINET-U and the 
Ugandan police was an important necessary condition for the implementation of PARP. 
HURINET-U has been present on the ground in Uganda since 1993, and it has actively and 
promptly followed up on human rights violations and has been in constant dialogue and 
exchange with the police. 
 
5. Sampling and survey 
The implementation of PARP was limited to eleven Ugandan police districts.†† The restricted 
geographical ambit of PARP is used as a cornerstone of the empirical assessment. We sampled 
five districts where PARP activities took place and five comparable districts that were not 
included in the project. 
We conducted a survey among 600 police officers in the 10 districts, sampling 60 
officers within each district.‡‡ The survey took place in April 2015. Since the survey was 
                                                 
** Further details about PARP can be found in Hout et al. (2016). 
†† The eleven police districts in which HURINET-U mainly worked are Arua, Bushenyi, Gulu, Kabale, Kabarole, 
Kampala, Lira, Masaka, Mbarara, Moroto and Soroti.  
‡‡ The survey districts are Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja Kabale, Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana and Soroti. 
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conducted roughly two years after the end of the intervention, we can only identify effects that 
have ‘survived’. We consider this a strength of the analysis since assessments done right after 
interventions that aim to increase knowledge and change behaviour are mainly registering 
immediate effects. 
Individual officers were selected in a stratified way to capture officers across all ranks. 
The data collection was carried out by our local university partner, the Uganda Management 
Institute, in consultation with the police. Police officers were approached after authorization 
from the police headquarters and the regional police. Importantly, HURINET-U did not 
participate in the selection of respondents and/or data collection. 
Regional-level officers were purposively chosen to participate in the survey because of 
their leading position. Similarly, the leading police officers of the district headquarters were 
purposively included. Police stations within districts were randomly sampled, with half the 
officers in our sample coming from small stations (with up to 10 officers) and an additional 
20% from medium-sized agencies (with 11 to 25 officers), resulting in a total of 70% of our 
sampled police officers being employed in agencies of up to 25 officers. The day of the survey 
was picked randomly and police officers from the districts participated in the survey based on 
availability or presence. Since local police stations only have few officers, we do not expect 
any systematic selection of participants into our sample. We applied this sampling procedure to 
have a stratified sample of officers that represents the full spectrum of police work, functions, 
positions and hierarchies.  
The survey consisted of a self-administered pen and paper questionnaire in a classroom 
setting. During the survey, each officer was provided enough personal space to ensure privacy 
and confidentiality. To protect anonymity, we did not ask the officers to provide their names or 
addresses. The survey had two parts. In the first part, officers reported their basic socio-
economic characteristics. In the second and core part, officers were asked to review twelve 
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vignette cases that were formulated following the example of Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and 
Kutnjak Ivković (2005a, 2005b). In collaboration with HURINET-U and the Uganda Police 
Force, the cases were adapted to the local context to ensure that they are relevant, i.e., that the 
vignette cases reflect dilemmas faced by the Ugandan police. For example, we replaced the 
original scenario 4 (Klockars et al., 2006): ‘A police officer is widely liked in the community, 
and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his 
attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.’ This scenario had to be modified since this 
type of behaviour is not perceived as bribery in the context of Uganda. Gifts around Christmas 
time are considered acceptable. Similarly, since jewellery shops are not common in Uganda, 
we changed the original scenario 5 and introduced a burglary in a general merchandise shop. 
Further, we introduced the police complaint form and the treatment of demonstrators in other 
scenarios since these are important issues in the Ugandan context. The modified cases were 
pre-tested for their relevance in the field. Thus, we ensured that the changed case scenarios have 
cultural resonance. We feel that the context-specific adaptation has enhanced the quality of our 
study since it is based on an in-depth analysis of the local context and conditions prior to the 
use of the scenarios. 
In the survey, the cases were presented randomly to avoid an order by severity. For the 
sake of clarity we have grouped the cases into six categories of two cases each in the paper: the 
first group focuses on the code of conduct among police officers, the second on bribery, the 
third on fraud, the fourth on the refusal to register a complaint against the police, the fifth on 
severe crimes against individuals that are not followed up by the police, and the sixth on undue 
force used by the police against suspects and demonstrators. A detailed grouping of the twelve 
cases is presented in table A1 in appendix A1, while the exact wording can be found in appendix 
A2. Our survey also assessed gender dynamics, the findings of which are presented in a separate 
article (Wagner et al., 2017). 
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In line with Klockars et al.’s (2000; 2006) organisational/occupational approach that 
was addressed in section 2 above, our survey did not directly ask police officers about their 
behaviour in order to avoid biased responses. Instead, the police officers answered the following 
normative questions for each case: 
1. How serious do YOU consider this behaviour to be? 
2. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this 
behaviour? 
3. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR OFFICE consider this 
behaviour to be? 
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behaviour and was discovered doing 
so, what if any disciplinary measure do YOU think SHOULD follow? 
5. Would this behaviour be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?   
The possible answer categories range on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. Questions 1 and 3 could be 
answered on a categorical scale from 1 (not at all serious) to 5 (very serious). Responses to 
questions 2 and 5 ranged from ‘definitely not’ to ‘definitely yes’.  Question 4 on disciplinary 
measures could be answered with ‘none’ [1], ‘verbal reprimand’ [2], ‘written reprimand’ [3], 
‘period of suspension without pay’ [4], ‘demotion in rank’ [5] and ‘dismissal’ [6].  
The advantage of using vignettes is that all officers are presented with the same cases; 
the disadvantage is that we do not observe actual behaviour. Clearly, we cannot determine 
whether police officers are indeed honest or corrupt. But the vignette approach has received 
strong validation in public health research, which documented consistency between 
hypothetical cases and actual behaviour (Peabody et al., 2000; Van der Meer and Mackenbach, 
1998).  
 
6. Descriptive statistics 
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6.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of the police officers 
Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics are presented in 
Table 1. The average officer in the sample is almost 42 years old. Slightly less than 25% of the 
respondents are female and most of the officers are married (84%). On average, they live in a 
household with almost 7 people and the majority of the interviewees are household heads (84%). 
Almost half the officers have secondary education, 27% completed advanced secondary 
education and 25% have a higher education degree. The remainder (less than 3%) have only 
primary education.  
As to economic well-being, around 60% of the respondents earn between UGX 300,000 
and 500,000 on a monthly basis.§§ The average respondent owns 1.34 mobile phones and has 
almost 2 habitable rooms at home. Membership in clubs or community organizations is reported 
by almost half the respondents, and sports activities by 53%. These latter two variables serve 
as controls for the activity levels of the respondents and their readiness to engage in extra 
activities. 
A comparison of PARP participants and non-participants shows very few differences. 
All but three characteristics are statistically identical. Significant differences, which are 
controlled for in the multivariate analyses, relate to income (with PARP participants earning 
less than non-participants) and housing. 
The specific police work of the respondents is part of the second set of control variables 
related to the duration of their work as police officer, their rank, the section of the police force 
they work in, and the available infrastructure at their station (Table 1).  
The average length of service is 18.8 years, with no differences between PARP 
participants and non-participants. Rank, however, does seem to matter. Of all respondents, 6% 
are of higher ranks; PARP participants are more likely to hold a higher rank (8% among PARP 
                                                 
§§ This roughly corresponds to a range of USD 80 and 140 (UGX/USD exchange rate of 0.00028 on July 28, 2017). 
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participants versus 5% among non-participants) since the intervention targeted high-ranking 
officials. Roughly one third of the officers are of middle rank; among these more officers work 
in non-PARP districts. The majority of the officers are of low rank; here there are no differences 
between our two groups of respondents. The data further indicate that police officers with 
general duties are overrepresented among PARP participants, while significantly fewer 
participants work in the investigation section. Finally, in comparison to non-participants, PARP 
participants tend to come from smaller stations with fewer cars. Thus, policing conditions differ 
to some extent between the two groups and we therefore control for work- and infrastructure-
related variables in the analysis. 
Data on the geographical distribution of the respondents form the last group of control 
variables (Table 1). As the descriptive statistics show, the control districts were well chosen 
since the average population size and growth as well as the average poverty level are identical 
across PARP and non-PARP districts. Differences between PARP and non-PARP districts 
show up in relation to inequality and the number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, but 
these are significant only at the 10% level. Average crime and homicide rates across districts 
are identical.  
To give an overview of the composition of our sample, we provide the distribution of 
PARP participants and non-participants across districts in the Appendix, Table A2. We show 
that most PARP participants are still located in the five districts where training activities took 
place, but roughly 13% of participating officers reside in non-targeted districts. The non-PARP 
district with the largest share of PARP participants is Iganga (6.8%).  Similarly, the control 
sample of non-participants is mainly drawn from the five control districts. They make up for 
76% of the control sample. The remaining 24% of the control sample resides now in former 
intervention districts. Since this can result in potential spillover effects, we control for it in the 
robustness tests of our multivariate analysis. Furthermore, Table A2 shows that we reached the 
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target sample of 60 participants in all but two districts where we only sampled 59 participants. 
The missing two participants were sampled from two other districts. Thus, the extent to which 
police officers were affected by PARP activities results predominantly from work-related 
characteristics and community features. We control for these two sets of confounding factors 
along with the individual characteristics in the multivariate analyses.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics of the case assessments 
Detailed descriptive statistics of the five outcome variables that we collected for the twelve 
cases are presented in Table 2. We show the simple averages resulting from the Likert scale 
answers.  
Across the twelve cases and five assessment criteria PARP participants tend to be more 
critical compared to non-participants. The first two vignette cases, on police code of conduct, 
are judged rather mildly. Receiving holidays in exchange for repairing a supervisor’s car is 
assessed moderately negatively (average score 3.72), although officers tend to be generally 
aware that such behaviour violates official policy (average score 4.24), which they would report 
(average score 4.06). PARP participants feel more strongly that disciplinary measures should 
follow (PARP: 4.016 versus non-PARP: 3.651). The misbehaviour described in the second case, 
related to covering a drunk colleague who caused an accident, is by and large seen as a light 
offence. Overall, PARP participants and non-participants tend to differ on the need to report 
the behaviour and on their judgment of the behaviour, with the former group taking, on average, 
a stricter position than the latter.  
The second group of cases depicts situations of bribery. Case 3 on accepting gifts while 
on duty has the lowest Likert score of all cases. All respondents are close to neutral (value of 3) 
when it comes to reporting a colleague, although PARP participants tend to be slightly more 
critical than non-participants. Case 4, related to the acceptance of a bribe after observed 
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speeding, is evaluated very critically, as is reflected in the score of 4.58 among PARP 
participants and 4.22 among non-participants. Fraud cases are shown in the third group: case 5 
(the misappropriation of money from a found wallet) and case 6 (illegal enrichment when 
investigating a burglary) are judged harshly and a great majority of respondents among PARP 
participants and non-participants indicate they would report a colleague who shows this type of 
behaviour.  
Overall, the first six cases suggest that police officers have a clear idea about acceptable 
and non-acceptable behaviour: the acceptance of bribes and misappropriation are evaluated 
more critically than violations of the police code of conduct. In most cases, officers see 
themselves as more critical of misbehaviour than their colleagues. Responses to the question 
whether forms of behaviour violate official policy indicate the existence of a gap between 
formal rules and actual practices. Overall, PARP participants tend to evaluate the vignette cases 
more critically than non-participants. 
The next two cases depict situations of how police officers deal with complaints. The 
refusal to register a complaint and the humiliation of the complainant (case 7) is judged rather 
mildly, but the majority of officers considers the arrest of a complainant on false grounds (case 
8) to be unacceptable. This is in line with our expectations and shows the internal coherence of 
the vignette cases. The differences across respondents indicate that the accountability project 
may have left an impact: PARP participants rate the severity of case 7 with 3.988, while non-
participants rate it with 3.360. The more severe case 8 is considered as an example of serious 
misbehaviour as indicated by the rating of 4.332 among PARP participants compared to 3.780 
among non-participants.  
Lastly, cases of reported severe crimes against individuals without adequate follow-up 
by the police (cases 9 and 10), and of the use of undue force (cases 11 and 12) are assessed very 
critically. Again, PARP participants tend to be much more critical than non-participants, which 
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suggests that officers who took part in the project apply a more careful judgment when it comes 
to abuse of power and human rights violations.  
 
7. Empirical model 
In our identification strategy, we rely on propensity score matching (PSM). We opted for this 
approach since project locations were not selected randomly and data was collected in only one 
round after the implementation of PARP. We pool the responses for all 12 cases so that we 
obtain an estimation sample of 7,200 observations. 
For PSM to be valid we need to impose an assumption about conditional independence, 
which states that given a set of observable covariates, which are not affected by the project (i.e., 
exogenous to PARP), potential outcomes are independent of project assignment (Lechner, 
1999). It implies the strong assumption that selection into PARP is solely based on observable 
characteristics for which we can control in the analysis. The discussion above indicated that 
selection into PARP appeared to be mainly based on work-related characteristics and 
community features and not on the personal characteristics of police officers. We are therefore 
confident that we can properly capture participation with control variables related to individual 
and work-related characteristics as well as community features.  
By employing a logistic regression of project allocation on the observable covariates, 
we determine the probability of participation in PARP for every police officer i based on 
observable characteristics: 
P(Di = 1|Xi,Ii,DCi,Ci) = l[0 + Xi X + Ii I + DCi DC +  Ci C +  i], 
where Di is a dummy variable coding for participation in PARP, and 𝑙[. ] is the logistic function. 
All observable characteristics are collected in Xi, Ii, DCi and Ci. The unobserved error term is 
denoted by i. The individual characteristics are denoted by Xi, police station infrastructure by 
Ii and district characteristics by DCi. With these control variables we account for the nested 
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design of the study since police officers are integrated in police stations and police stations are 
organized within districts. The individual level characteristics Xi are captured by age, gender, 
marital status, heading the household, level of education, level of income, number of habitable 
rooms in the house, household size, number of mobile phones owned, engagement in sport 
activities and membership in an organization. In addition, we control for work-experience 
variables. These are the years of service, rank and unit of operation. The infrastructure controls 
Ii are the number of rooms, police cars, motorcycles and bicycles at the police station. The 
district characteristics DCi are population size (in log), population growth rate, headcount 
poverty rate, inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), share of the population belonging 
to the largest ethnic group, number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, and the crime and 
homicide rates. Finally, we control for case-specific effects (Ci) to account for the differences 
in the severity of the presented vignette cases. By deriving the probability of participation from 
the logistic regression, we ensure that persons with the same observable characteristics as 
denoted by X, I and DC have a positive probability of being both participants and non-
participants, which generates the common support (Heckman et al., 1999). It allows us to form 
matches of individuals with similar characteristics observed for PARP participants and non-
participants. 
We derive the PSM estimator of the impact of PARP as the mean difference in outcome 
variables over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution 
of participants:  
τ
PSM 
=E { E[Y(1)| D=1,P(X,I,DC,C)]−E[Y(0)| D=0,P(X,I,DC,C)] }, 
where Y is the outcome under study, 1 represents PARP participants and 0 non-participants. We 
apply nearest-neighbour matching by matching each individual from the group of PARP 
participants with suitable individuals from the control group. We employ the revised PSM 
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procedure that was proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008) to derive consistent standard 
errors. 
In addition, we compare our results to an estimator that makes use of the PSM weights 
in a regression framework, the so-called inverse probability weighting (IPW) (Wooldridge, 
2007). In this model, the observations of the non-participants are weighted by their respective 
propensity scores. Those non-participants that share characteristics with participants, and thus 
have larger propensity scores, receive larger weights in the regression model. We derive this 
second estimator to gauge the robustness of the PSM results.  
Finally, in order to avoid selectivity in highlighting possible effects on the five 
individual outcomes, we also employ a seemingly-unrelated regression model that accounts for 
correlation of the error term across specifications, i.e. multiple hypothesis testing. Moreover, 
the approach allows us to derive one single average effect of the intervention across all five 
outcome categories (Casey et al., 2012; Clingingsmith et al., 2009). 
 
8. Results 
8.1  Determinants of participation in PARP 
Before assessing the impact of the intervention, we identify the observable characteristics that 
determine PARP participation with a logistic regression model. Table A3 (Appendix) shows 
that the individual socio-demographic characteristics of police officers are unlikely 
determinants of participation in PARP. This applies to all individual characteristics except for 
being member of a club or community organization. Members of such organizations are more 
likely to participate in PARP. Concerning work experience related variables, membership of 
particular sections within the police force – in particular, general service – and holding a higher 
rank are positively related to PARP participation. These findings are not surprising since they 
reflect the outreach strategy of PARP.   
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District-level covariates are the most important determinants of participation in PARP, 
which suggests that HURINET-U focused on less populated and less ethnically homogeneous 
districts with higher poverty but less inequality. PARP districts appear to have more police 
officers and higher crime rates but lower homicide rates. All district-level covariates are 
statistically significant at the 1%-level and in practical terms highly relevant. The relationship 
with PARP activities suggests that HURINET-U selected the intervention districts mainly on 
the basis of perceptions of community characteristics and the crime environment. 
Concomitantly, we can consider PARP activities as an exogenous event for the individual police 
officers concerned. Self-selection bias, resulting from unobservable individual characteristics, 
is unlikely. Therefore, in assessing police integrity we rely on the observed differences for the 
matched sample of PARP participants and non-participants controlling for the above-mentioned 
individual, work experience, police infrastructure and district level confounders. 
 
8.2  Impact of PARP  
Results of the comparisons of the outcome variables between PARP participants and non-
participants are presented in Table 3. We consider the impact of the PARP intervention across 
the five normative questions. Panel A of Table 3 presents the simple comparison of means 
without accounting for confounding actors. 
Results show that across all five questions PARP participants tend to give a more critical 
rating, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1%-level. In line with the case-
specific descriptive statistics (Table 2), PARP participants score higher on average, which 
indicates that they assess the depicted behaviour more critically: Among PARP participants, 
the assessment of the perceived seriousness of the cases is most critical (0.49); the least critical 
rating is given for the action that should follow according to the police officers (0.22).  
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Next, we present the impact estimates resulting from the propensity score model (PSM, 
Panel B), those from inverse probability weighting (IPW, Panel C) and the ones from the 
seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR, Panel D). The coefficient estimates are similar to 
the raw comparison of means. In the PSM and IPW models, the judgment of case severity 
differs by over half a point between PARP participants and non-participants and is highly 
statistically significant. This supports the conclusion that PARP had a positive impact on 
normative judgments, importantly including human rights as one of its main targets. The 
coefficient estimate that accounts for the covariance in the error term across the five questions 
is smallest in magnitude but again it leaves no doubt that PARP participants judge case severity 
more critically. 
With regard to reporting of misbehaviour, PARP participants are on average only 0.41 
points (PSM) more likely to report a colleague’s misbehaviour. While the coefficient on 
reporting is smaller in size than the one on case severity, it is still highly statistically significant. 
This suggests that PARP participants are not only more critical about inappropriate behaviour 
but also more inclined to report it. The IPW and SUR models fully support the findings. 
PARP activities also seem to have impacted on the way the judgments of fellow police 
officers are perceived. Yet, the average effect is 0.21 (=0.50-0.29) points smaller compared to 
the estimate on case severity (PSM). Police officers have the impression that colleagues take 
misbehaviour less seriously than they do themselves. PARP participants have more confidence 
in their own judgment than that of their colleagues. Again, the IPW and SUR models confirm 
the PSM findings with even slightly higher coefficients (0.39 and 0.35, respectively, compared 
to 0.29). 
Differences among respondents are less pronounced when it comes to the disciplinary 
measures they consider appropriate in case of misdemeanours (question 4). According to the 
PSM model, the estimated difference in average scores is 0.21. This is statistically significant, 
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but not large enough to ascribe considerable impacts to PARP. Responses to question 5 indicate 
that PARP participants appear to know more about their agency’s official rules of conduct. The 
impact estimate of 0.27 indicates that PARP participants are more ready to define misbehaviour 
as a violation of official policy. The IPW and SUR models produce lower coefficient estimates. 
Nevertheless, all differences are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. 
Finally, we calculated the regression-based average difference across the five questions. 
Calculations on the basis of the PSM, IPW and SUR model result in global average effects 
ranging between 0.33 and 0.34, showing that across models we coherently identify a positive 
and practically meaningful impact of PARP. Statistical significance can only be assessed with 
SUR indicating that the effect is significant at the 1%-level. 
To further assess the robustness of our findings, we employed five additional models. 
First, we replaced the police-infrastructure and district-level covariates with district-level 
dummies (Panel E). We identify similar but considerably bigger effects. The findings show that 
the estimates presented so far can be seen as conservative impact estimates. From a 
methodological point of view, the results suggests that police infrastructure and the situation in 
the district are related to police integrity, i.e. if the police officers are already unsatisfied with 
the provided infrastructure, they are less likely to take their work seriously. Thus, the quality of 
the provided infrastructure is very likely to be reflected when the officers are asked about their 
work attitude and integrity.  
Second, we further challenge the role of district level control variables by estimating a 
specification that only includes individual level control variables. Results are presented in Table 
3, Panel F. The coefficient estimates tend to be even larger, suggesting that we overestimate the 
impact of PARP if we fail to control for infrastructure and district variables. 
Third, we addressed possible spillovers from PARP participants who relocated to non-
PARP districts and vice versa by excluding PARP participants who reside in non-PARP 
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districts and non-participants that reside in PARP districts (Panel F). This results in a smaller 
sample, as sample size drops to 5,820 observations.  The effects we identify are slightly smaller 
when compared to the PSM model with all observations and the full set of controls (Panel B). 
Yet, in practical terms the impacts are still meaningful and all findings are highly statistically 
significant. Moreover, the identified global average effect is bigger than the one identified with 
the SUR model.  We prefer the original specification with the ‘movers’ as it allows us to address 
structural effects at the district level. The spillover specification does not allow us to control for 
district-related variables as they are perfectly collinear.*** Furthermore, if there are indeed 
spillovers, it makes it more difficult for us to find an effect in general since the control group 
will also show higher support for police integrity.  
Fourth, we employed an empirical specification that excludes individuals in leading 
positions, i.e. those with high rank. Since the sub-sample of PARP participants has more police 
officers of high rank, the results could have been driven by these individuals. Results of the 
model without police officers in leading positions are presented in Panel H. Except for some 
numerical differences our results are well aligned with the full model (Panel B). It is therefore 
unlikely that the results are driven by officers of high rank, who account for only 6% of the 
overall sample.  
Fifth, in a last robustness test we excluded all ‘spillover’ police officers along with those 
                                                 
*** Concerning spillovers, we note that since HURINET-U is an NGO with limited funds, it had to restrict its work 
ambit in particular in the second phase of the program, the phase that we are evaluating. Yet, police officers in 
leading positions also meet at the national level and exchange about the activities in their districts. At the same 
time, we are not aware of any attempt from non-PARP districts to be part of the intervention and merely hearing 
about PARP is not likely to change operations. We consider it unlikely that information about the intervention is 
spread very vocally since the intervention aims at an a priori unpopular change and implies outside involvement 
in operations that are traditionally considered as being exclusively controlled by the police. Based on our 
knowledge of the Ugandan context and the fact that the police is considered to be the most corrupt institution by 
the Ugandan citizens (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006a), we do not expect police officers to full-
heartedly fight for the implementation of the complaints form, a stronger focus on human rights (of suspects and 
arrestees) and more respect for demonstrators. Lastly, the Ugandan situation is such that the regime, including its 
agents such as police officers, tries to control society (Anderson and Fisher, 2016). Therefore, it is a valid 
assumption that PARP-participants who moved to non-PARP districts are likely to have little influence on the 
behaviour of their colleagues. 
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of high rank (Panel I). As for the previous specifications, the results are virtually identical with 
those of the full model (Panel B). 
Further, we note that our analysis identified only the effects that have ‘survived’, since 
the survey was conducted roughly two years after the end of the PARP intervention. In research 
that is done shortly after an intervention, the analysis may pick up knowledge about best 
practices that is still fresh but that may dwindle after some time. The time lag of two years adds 
strength to our analysis as it permits a focus on long-lasting impacts rather than short-term 
effects.  
To sum up, the analyses reported above indicate that PARP seems to have had an impact 
mainly through normative perceptions about the severity of cases. The replies of the police 
officers to the vignette cases indicate that participants in PARP activities score higher on 
average across all cases and all questions, thus indicating that PARP has been successful in 
creating heightened awareness of what is right and wrong police behaviour. Most importantly, 
PARP was successful in diffusing knowledge about proper policing in relation to cases of more 
severe police misbehaviour. The most noticeable differences result from the treatment of 
‘clients’ (former arrestees and suspects, thieves, persons complaining), which indicates that the 
human rights agenda of PARP has been translated into better knowledge of the police officers 
who participated in the intervention.  
In addition, our findings indicate that there seems to be a disparity between officers’ 
own assessment of the severity of the cases and their perception of how violations should be 
treated. Thus, although police officers know the rules about good policing, they do not fully 
comply with them in their daily practice. This may imply that official standards are only 
partially enforced, and that individual officers have room to interpret the rules to their 
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advantage. Consequently, the change in normative views about acceptable and non-acceptable 
behaviour may not have produced a behavioural change of the police officers themselves.††† 
 
9. Conclusion 
The findings of our research on PARP, which was implemented in Uganda between 2010 and 
2013, indicate that the intervention seems to have contributed to greater awareness among 
police officers about the need for on-the-job integrity and proper behaviour vis-à-vis the 
Ugandan citizens. Comparing police officers who took part in PARP activities with non-
participants, the attitudinal difference between the two groups on a variety of vignette cases 
suggests that the project has had lasting positive results. We conclude from our findings that 
police accountability may be enhanced by targeted attention to unacceptable police behaviour, 
breaches of integrity and corruption. Yet, activities on good and accountable policing are not 
very likely to assume their full potential when used as stand-alone instruments; they need to be 
combined with credible internal enforcement mechanisms. 
Our research suffers from two non-negligible limitations: First, we had to resort to a 
quasi-experimental evaluation design. Second, we cannot fully rule out spillover effects. Future 
work on the impact of police integrity trainings should resort to more rigorous evaluation 
designs to gauge whether the current findings can be substantiated.  
While PARP activities were scattered, heterogeneous interventions, the project seems 
to have impacted on police integrity by altering the perceptions and attitudes of participating 
police officers. We cannot, however, be sure that the changes in perceptions and attitudes have 
translated into improved practices since our survey tool does not allow us to observe 
behavioural outcomes. Overall, we conclude that the measurement and systematic analysis of 
                                                 
††† A qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews confirms the quantitative findings. Results of the qualitative 
analysis can be found in Hout et al. (forthcoming).  
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(changes in) perceptions and attitudes remains a challenge. The findings highlight the need for 
future research on behavioural changes and on measurement of perceptions and attitudes, 
particularly from a comparative perspective. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of control variables 
  Overall 
PARP 
participants 
Non-
participants 
DiM 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean p-value 
Socio-demographic covariates      
   Age 41.785 9.426 42.244 41.457 0.314 
   Gender: Female 0.228  0.208 0.243 0.317 
   Marital status (Excluded category: Not married)    
      Married  0.843  0.852 0.837 0.622 
   Household size 6.672 3.992 6.868 6.531 0.309 
   Household head 0.843  0.840 0.846 0.85 
   Education levels (Excluded category: Primary)    
      Secondary  0.455  0.476 0.44 0.383 
      Advanced secondary  0.268  0.248 0.283 0.343 
      Higher  0.248  0.252 0.246 0.861 
   Income level (Excluded category: Incomes<200,000UGX)    
      Income 200,000-300,000UGX 0.115  0.144 0.094 0.060* 
      Income 300,000-500,000UGX 0.603  0.544 0.646 0.012** 
      Income 500,000-700,000UGX 0.140  0.148 0.134 0.634 
      Income>700,000UGX 0.095  0.108 0.086 0.360 
   # mobile phones owned 1.337 0.578 1.292 1.369 0.110 
   # habitable rooms 1.750 1.103 1.924 1.626 0.001*** 
   Member of a club/organization 0.482  0.484 0.48 0.923 
   Does sport 0.525  0.520 0.529 0.836 
Work related covariates    
   Police section (Excluded category: Other sections and duties)    
      Traffic 0.043  0.028 0.054 0.119 
      Investigation 0.262  0.216 0.294 0.032** 
      Intelligence 0.063  0.064 0.063 0.955 
      General duties 0.463  0.584 0.377 0.000*** 
   Years of experience 18.800 10.556 19.384 18.383 0.252 
   Police rank (Excluded category: Low rank)    
      High rank 0.060  0.080 0.046 0.082* 
      Medium rank 0.322  0.300 0.337 0.338 
   # rooms of police station 12.758 9.259 11.472 13.677 0.004*** 
   # police cars at station 1.522 1.508 1.176 1.769 0.000*** 
   # police motorcycles at station 6.762 12.557 6.064 7.260 0.250 
   # police bicycles at station 2.147 5.361 2.316 2.026 0.514 
District level covariates     
   Population size  427,400 92,560 394,880 459,920 0.292 
   Population growth rate 2.226 0.777 2.132 2.320 0.726 
   Poverty head count rate 22.310 8.539 23.280 21.340 0.742 
   Gini index 0.398 0.073 0.356 0.440 0.064* 
   Population share belonging to largest ethnicity 73.980 14.454 76.240 71.720 0.649 
   Police officers per 100,000 inhabitants 133.214 0.090 133.261 133.166 0.095* 
   Crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 338.232 143.510 296.802 379.662 0.393 
   Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 8.629 3.910 9.629 7.628 0.451 
Note: The sample consists of 600 police officers, 250 are PARP participants, 350 are non-participants. ***/**/* denotes 
p<0.01/0.05/0.1, respectively. Descriptive statistics of district level control variables are calculated on the basis of 10 district 
level observations. DiM abbreviates difference in means, the associated p-value is presented. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and comparison of means of the outcome variables 
 
Severity (own 
judgment) 
Reporting 
Severity 
(others) 
Disciplinary 
measure 
Official 
policy 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers   
Case 1: Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 
     Mean PARP participant 4.012*** 4.408*** 3.924*** 4.016*** 4.420*** 
     Mean Non- participant 3.511 3.809 3.529 3.651 4.117 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 
     Mean PARP participant 3.968*** 4.100*** 3.708 3.800** 4.224* 
     Mean Non-participant 3.526 3.789 3.517 3.534 4.023 
     DiM: p-value (0.001) (0.007) (0.115) (0.028) (0.076) 
Group 2: Bribery  
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 
     Mean PARP participant 3.788*** 3.356** 3.640*** 3.312** 4.112** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.351 3.029 3.306 3.034 3.843 
     DiM: p-value (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.029) 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe  
     Mean PARP participant 4.576*** 4.476*** 4.128*** 4.404 4.684*** 
     Mean Non-participant 4.217 4.094 3.771 4.249 4.440 
     DiM: p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.137) (0.007) 
Group 3: Fraud   
Case 5: Officer taking money of found wallet   
     Mean PARP participant 4.352*** 4.564*** 4.084*** 4.360*** 4.620*** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.820 4.063 3.589 3.931 4.300 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods when investigating a burglary 
     Mean PARP participant 4.688*** 4.752*** 4.496*** 5.212** 4.736** 
     Mean Non-participant 4.317 4.497 4.206 4.966 4.577 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.047) 
Group 4: Refusal to register complaints   
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 
     Mean PARP participant 3.988*** 4.244*** 3.700** 3.624** 4.484*** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.360 3.914 3.429 3.374 4.191 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.026) (0.020) (0.004) 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for false accusation 
     Mean PARP participant 4.332*** 4.632*** 4.160*** 4.200 4.644 
     Mean Non-participant 3.780 4.360 3.834 4.066 4.506 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.191) (0.115) 
Group 5: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating  
     Mean PARP participant 4.532*** 4.632*** 4.312*** 4.072 4.656 
     Mean Non-participant 4.091 4.357 3.991 3.969 4.546 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.329) (0.173) 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on   
     Mean PARP participant 4.192*** 4.648*** 4.268*** 2.744 4.684*** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.729 4.337 3.980 2.717 4.420 
     DiM: p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.788) (0.003) 
Group 6: Undue force used by the police   
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief    
     Mean PARP participant 4.228*** 4.348*** 3.964*** 3.976 4.504*** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.657 3.883 3.654 3.803 4.243 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.133) (0.010) 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration   
     Mean PARP participant 4.436*** 4.252*** 4.432*** 4.064 4.664*** 
     Mean Non-participant 3.889 3.911 4.094 3.823 4.397 
     DiM: p-value (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.171) (0.005) 
Note: N = 600. DiM abbreviates difference in means, the associated p-value is presented. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 
1/5/10% level, respectively. Column 1 “Severity (own judgment)” refers to question “How serious do YOU consider this 
behavior to be?”, Column 2 “Reporting” refers to question “Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who 
engaged in this behavior?”, Column 3 “Severity (others)” refers to question “How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN 
YOUR OFFICE consider this behavior to be?”, Column 4 “Disciplinary measure” refers to question “If an officer in your 
35 
 
agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?”, Column 
5 “Official policy” refers to question “Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?”. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:Main results 
 
How 
serious do 
YOU 
consider 
this 
behaviour 
to be? 
Do you 
think YOU 
would report 
a fellow 
police 
officer who 
engaged in 
this 
behaviour? 
How serious 
do MOST 
POLICE 
OFFICERS 
IN YOUR 
OFFICE 
consider 
this 
behaviour to 
be? 
If an officer in 
your agency 
engaged in this 
behaviour and 
was discovered 
doing so, what 
if any discipline 
do YOU think 
SHOULD 
follow? 
Would this 
behaviour 
be regarded 
as a 
violation of 
official 
policy in 
your 
agency? 
Global 
average 
across all 
five 
questions 
Panel A: Simple Comparison of Means (no covariates)    
Treatment effect 0.487*** 0.364*** 0.326*** 0.222*** 0.236*** 0.327 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Control group average 3.771 4.004 3.742 3.760 4.300  
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching (full set of covariates)    
Treatment effect 0.503*** 0.407*** 0.286*** 0.213*** 0.270*** 0.336 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Panel C: Inverse Probability Weighting (full set of covariates)   
 
Treatment effect 0.578*** 0.374*** 0.386*** 0.134** 0.246*** 0.344 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000)  
Panel D: Average Effect from Simultaneous Regression (full set of covariates)   
Treatment effect 0.437*** 0.377*** 0.350*** 0.191** 0.181** 0.210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.041) (0.000) 
Robustness checks       
Panel E: Propensity Score Matching (excluding infrastructure and district variables, imposing district fixed 
effects) 
Treatment effect 0.676*** 0.725*** 0.466*** 0.437*** 0.381*** 0.537 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)  
Panel F: Propensity Score Matching (including only individual level control variables) 
 0.832*** 0.671*** 0.390*** 0.661*** 0.519*** 0.615 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)  
Panel G: Propensity Score Matching (Excluding ‘spillover’ police officers and district covariates) 
Treatment effect 0.460*** 0.241*** 0.225*** 0.219*** 0.131** 0.255 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.025)  
Panel H: Propensity Score Matching (Excluding police officers of high rank) 
Treatment effect 0.472*** 0.447*** 0.421*** 0.255*** 0.223*** 0.364 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Panel I: Propensity Score Matching (Excluding ‘spillover’ police officers, police officers of high rank and district 
covariates) 
Treatment effect 0.506*** 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.240*** 0.308*** 0.319 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
Note: Robust p-values in parentheses. Only the treatment effect is presented. Covariates are included. Sample size is 7,200 for 
specifications in Panels A to E (12 vignette cases à 600 respondents). The specification in Panel G contains 5,820 observations 
since all possible ‘spillover’ police officers (PARP-participants in non-PARP districts and vice versa) were excluded. The 
specification in Panel H contains 6,768 observations since all police officers of high rank were excluded.  The specification in 
Panel I contains only 5,436 observations since all possible ‘spillover’ police officers (PARP-participants in non-PARP districts 
and vice versa) and all police officers of high rank were excluded. Details about the individual and police-experience related 
control variables that are included in all specifications (except Panel A) can be found in Section 7. In addition, the results 
presented in panels B, C and D contain the police infrastructure and district level controls detailed in Section 7. Instead of 
containing police infrastructure and district control variables, the specification in panel E contains district fixed effects. The 
specification in Panel F excludes the ‘relocated’ police officers and district control variables. The latter need to be excluded 
due to perfect multicollinearity. (***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level, respectively. 
